I develop a model in which different technological conditions lead to distinct equilibria with different patterns in labor mobility, promotion, earning distribution, and provision of firm-sponsored training. Key is the asymmetric learning of workers' characteristics. Because of the information that is conveyed to the market by promotion, firms have incentives to adopt strategic promotion policies, which result in different patterns in the use of internal labor market. The theory explains well the differences between the Japanese and the United States labor markets.
I. Introduction
Different countries display different patterns in labor mobility, promotion, training, and earning distribution. Although economists have developed many building-block models that allow them to analyze subsets of those labor market characteristics, few models predict what combinations of those patterns are more likely to appear or explain how institutions in a particular country affect its labor market characteristics in a systematic way. In this article, I see countries as different parameterizations of a model and argue that different institutional developments could lead to different equilibria that embody different sets of This article is a revised version of a chapter of my PhD dissertation. I am indebted to Edward Lazear, John Roberts, and Masahiko Aoki for their guidance and valuable suggestions. I must also thank Yukiko Abe, Barton Hamilton, Kazuo Koike, Glenn MacDonald, Gary Miller, Hodaka Morita, Jack Nickerson, Michael Waldman, and Jeffrey Zwiebel for their insightful comments. Contact the author at owan@olin.wustl.edu. patterns in mobility, wage, and promotion dynamics. 1 The article applies its results to a comparison of the Japanese and the U.S. internal labor markets.
The model in this article extends the literature of job assignment with asymmetric learning: a firm is uncertain about its worker's productivity when he enters the labor force but gradually learns about it during his employment. This learning is asymmetric-potential employers do not directly observe a worker's productivity. As a result, a promotion serves as a signal of the worker's productivity, as has already been modeled by Waldman (1984) , Milgrom and Oster (1987) , Ricart i Costa (1988) , Bernhardt and Scoones (1993) and others. In this line of literature, employers assign jobs strategically knowing this signaling effect, and the resulting "lemons problem" rules out many efficient promotions in the equilibrium. Although most research in this literature focuses on the learning of workers' ability, this article considers the learning of both their ability and firm-specific skills. A distinguishing feature of this model is that a worker's ability (general human capital) is acquired and revealed to the current employer in a relatively early stage of his employment, while his match quality (firm-specific human capital) takes much more time to be improved and evaluated by the employer. In general, the current employer can consider promoting a worker every time the employer obtains new information about the worker's characteristics. In our model, since the worker's ability is revealed to the current employer earlier than the worker's match quality, promotion becomes a noisier signal of the worker's ability as his employment with the firm gets longer. As a result, early promotion increases the market value of able workers in the early stage of their employment and increases labor mobility, as a promoted worker can find a better outside option when he observes low match quality with the current employer later. On the other hand, late promotion induces low outside option values to able workers because the "signals" are contaminated by the workers with low ability but high match quality. Employers' strategic consideration of this "sig-naling effect" of early promotion results in the distortion of promotion policies adopted by firms in general.
I have developed a simple model in which a worker's ability can take only two values, high or low, and firms can choose one of either early promotion policy or late promotion policy. As long as it is efficient to promote high-ability workers without knowing their match quality, it is socially desirable that all firms adopt the early promotion policy. Which promotion policy should appear in the equilibrium, however, depends on job design, distribution of worker characteristics, and the relative value of firm-specific human capital across jobs, and the model offers rich interpretations about organizational designs. Furthermore, the late promotion equilibrium could be socially efficient once we endogenize the firms' provision of general training.
This model offers a framework that explains major differences between the Japanese and the U.S. labor markets in a systematic and predictable way. As the literature shows, the Japanese employment system can be characterized by low labor mobility, late promotion pattern, small intrafirm earnings dispersion and a high level of firm-sponsored training and the U.S. system has the opposite characteristics. I demonstrate that each equilibrium in the model captures each country's patterns of mobility, promotion, earning distributions, and firm-sponsored training.
More precisely, the model predicts that there will be lower labor mobility under the late promotion policy because the workers cannot improve their wages by switching firms.
3 It should be easily seen that intrafirm dispersion of earnings is smaller under the same promotion policy because limited outside options for able workers curb their wages and generate more wage compression. The last important implication is a firm's incentive to provide training. Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) show that, when labor market frictions compress the structure of wages, firms may pay for general training, and they have more incentive to provide general training as the distortion of wage structure increases. In contrast, firms should not pay for general training with a perfect labor market as is discussed in Becker (1962) . Since the workers' earnings vary less as their ability changes under the late promotion policy, it is the direct implication of Acemoglu and Pischke that firms have more incentive to provide general training under late promotion. 3 In an earlier version of this article, I also considered the human capital acquisition by the workers. I showed that the firm's promotion policy affects the relative return on investment in the two types of human capital while relative returns on promotion policies are also affected by the worker's choice of human capital investment. More precisely, the early promotion policy and workers' investment in general human capital are strategic complements and so are the late promotion policy and workers' investment in firm-specific human capital. See Owan (1999) for details.
Finally, the article attempts to provide a number of historical and organizational factors that may have led the Japanese and the U.S. economy to select different equilibria.
II. Basic Model
In this section, we develop a three-period model in which a firm chooses its promotion policy considering the signaling effect of each job assignment. There are more than two firms competing for workers. We refer to the firm that employs the focal worker as the employer and to the other firms as the market. After a worker is hired for the first time by a firm, he goes through training in period 0 and acquires firm-specific human capital. Then, the employer assigns the worker to some job and employs him for up to two additional periods, denoted period 1 and period 2. The worker's labor supply is assumed to be perfectly inelastic and fixed.
Workers are risk neutral and each worker's utility is his expected lifetime wage, ( ), where is his wage income in period
. Firms offer up-front wages to young workers to attract them, although t they are assumed to produce nothing during the training period. It is assumed that the capital market is perfect, and thus no restrictions on feasible wage schemes are imposed. Firms are also risk neutral and maximize ( ) for each worker they hire, where The variable represents random draws from a uniform distribution on b ij . Let and . Subscripts i and j will be omitted
in the rest of the article. The assumptions of binary and uniform distributions are not crucial for obtaining the results of our analysis, but simplifies the derivation. After the training period, worker's ability a does not change throughout his career, while the match quality b varies as he switches employers. In period 1 and period 2, a worker can be assigned to either of two jobs: an easy task called job 1, or a difficult managerial task called job 2, following Waldman (1984) . Let and be the jobs assigned to the t t 1 2 worker in period 1 and period 2. The history of a worker's job assignment is public information. Output on job 1 is independent of (t , t ) 1 2 the worker's ability or match quality, while output of job 2 is a function of ability or both. To be specific, worker i's output for the period equals: if he switches employers at the beginning of the period and is assigned x to job 1; if he stays with his employer from the previous period x ϩ s 1 and is assigned to job 1; a if he switches employers at the beginning of the period and is assigned to job 2; if he stays with his employer a ϩ b from the previous period and is assigned to job 2 where . E[b] p s 2 By construction, promotion can be defined as the change in job assignment from job 1 to job 2. The size of firm-specific component in each worker's productivity varies across workers in job 2 while it is constant in job 1. The expression can be interpreted as the difference s Ϫ s 2 1 in the firm-specificity of tasks between job 2 and job 1. Note that b p and .
Both characteristics a and b are unknown at the time the worker first enters the labor market. After the training period with the initial employer or, if the worker switches employers, the first period of employment with the new employer, a is revealed to the employer and the worker. Then, after period 1, b is revealed to the employer and the worker. Hence, if the worker switches employers at the beginning of period 1, his ability and match quality are directly revealed to his new employer at the end of period 1. The characteristics of a worker who switches firms at the beginning of period 2 are never directly revealed to the new employer before the end of his employment period.
The variables , a, and b are not observable to the market. It is also y t assumed that , a, and b are not verifiable and thus the employer cannot y t offer a contingent contract. Whether is observable or not does not W t affect our result.
The following conditions concerning the efficiency of job assignment are assumed. Assumption 1.
The first inequality implies that assigning job 2 to a new employee without knowing his ability is inefficient. The second line indicates that assigning job 2 to an trained or old employee whose ability is known to be low is inefficient while assigning the job to a worker with high ability is always efficient for both the current and other potential employers. The first inequality in the third line suggests that the worker who is recognized as able by the market can always find a better outside opportunity if his match quality with the present employer turns out to be low. Note that the inequality requires . The second inequality inb ! 0 dicates that a low-ability worker trained inside is more valuable than a high-ability worker from outside if the former worker's match quality is high enough.
The firms are assumed to play a Bertrand game to attract workers at the beginning of period 0. At the beginning of subsequent periods, all current employers make offers of wage and job assignment to their employees, and then the market can simultaneously make offers of wage and job assignment in an attempt to hire those workers away. Thereafter, the initial employers can make counteroffers after observing the offers from the market. This alternate offering continues until either side gives up countering. When the employer and the market make the same wage offer, the worker is assumed to stay with the current employer. I also assume that the employer fails to make a counteroffer with probability when 1 0 it should do so. This possibility of mistake gives all firms an incentive to seek raiding opportunities. Otherwise, the market may not bid up the wage knowing that the current employer will make a counteroffer even if the first offer by the employer is clearly lower than the minimum value of the worker. In the rest of the article, we consider the equilibrium in the limit as e approaches zero so that the usual mechanism of winner's curse prevents outside firms from bidding up the wage beyond the minimum value of the workers in the targeted group. By construction, the equilibrium wage must be set at such a level that no other firm can profitably hire the worker away.
We consider only spot contracts, meaning that a firm cannot write a contract in one period that commits the firm to a specific wage profile or action in a subsequent period. 4 Firms offer the same training period wage, , to the worker as no w 0 information is revealed at the beginning of the game, and nature chooses the first employer with equal probability. Since firms compete for workers in the entry-level labor market, the firm is willing to pay the worker in period 0 up to all the surplus it expects to get from the worker. Hence, the zero profit condition holds:
Let and be the wage of the worker in period 1 and
period 2 when his job history is . The equilibrium wages do not (t , t ) 1 2 4 Long-term contracts can improve the efficiency by reducing the gains from delayed promotion. If a firm can commit to pay high enough to lower-level workers in period 1, the firm will promote a worker whenever his ability is high. Since the firm loses money in period 1 by keeping a low-ability worker under this contract, the up-front wage in period 0 has to be reduced to finance the cost. This long-term contract is feasible only when (1) young workers are not liquidity constrained and thus could be very low, possibly negative or (2), if they are W 0 liquidity constrained, the difference between the workers with high and low ability ( ) is small enough so that in this long-term contract is high enough.
depend on the worker's characteristics as they are not observable to the market. If two workers have exactly the same job history, the market should offer the same wage and the employer has no reason to offer more than the market is willing to offer. It is trivial that competition induces the market to offer the highest possible wage given the information revealed by the job history. This, however, does not necessarily imply the efficient job assignment throughout all employment periods. The employer may adopt an inefficient promotion policy that maximizes the information rent it can exploit in subsequent periods and enables it to make the highest bid in period 0.
III. Equilibrium
We solve for sequential equilibria. Consider a group of workers with the same job history. Their equilibrium wage is the expected value, for the market, of those who switch employers (if there is some turnover) or are most likely to switch (if there is no turnover). When there is no turnover, the winner's curse keeps the market from bidding up the wage beyond the minimum value for the employer. In other words, if the wage offered by an outside firm exceeds the minimum value, the firm succeeds in stealing the worker only when his value is less than the wage it offers. I refer to the equilibrium wage as "market wage" because it is the maximum wage the market is willing to pay for the worker. When the market wage exceeds the worker's value for the employer, a turnover takes place.
First, notice that . Here, x and are the minimum
and the maximum values of any worker for the market, respectively. By adopting a certain job assignment, the employer sends a signal about the worker's capability to the market. The market's best response depends on their beliefs on the worker's ability. Suppose the market believes that a worker with job 1 and job 2 in period 1 has with probability and a l H 1 , respectively. When job 1 and job 2 are always assigned to somebody l 2 in period 1, and are derived by Bayes's rule. l l 1 2
The following lemma proves that more able workers are more likely to be promoted than less able workers, regardless of the market belief. For expositional convenience, let us define the value function, , v(a, t ) 1 that represents the worker's continuation value for the employer at the end of period 1 when the worker has ability a and has been assigned job in period 1. More specifically, is the expected rent the employer t v(a, t ) 1 1 can extract from the worker in period 2. The firm will promote a worker with a in period 1 if
Owan Thus the net gain from promoting a worker is
Lemma 1. The net gain from promoting a worker with in period a H 1 is always strictly larger than that from promoting a worker with in a L the same period. Or, more precisely,
, regardless of the market belief about the promotion
Proof. See appendix A. Lemma 1 allows us to narrow down the possible outcomes to the following four cases: (1) all workers are assigned job 1 in period 1, (2) only part or all of high-ability workers are promoted in period 1, (3) all high-ability workers and part of low-ability workers are promoted in period 1, and (4) all workers are promoted. We eventually show that either case 1 or case 2 takes place in the equilibrium.
The next lemma describes the equilibrium wage function.
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Lemma 2. When and in the equilibrium,
Proof. See appendix B. You can easily verify that and are increasing in b.
Note that the employer's profit is hedged against low match quality but captures the full surplus from high match quality. When b turns out to be low, the employer simply needs to assign him to job 1 or let him 5 The result that the second-period promotion does not affect the wage crucially depends on our assumption . When , there is another equi-
librium in which and the promotion decision in the second period w (1, 2) p a 2 H is distorted. We rule out this possibility because our comparative statics analysis does not change much by the inclusion and we want to focus on the case when late promotion leads to wage compression.
leave to go to another firm in period 2. As the option value is increasing in the volatility of the price of underlying securities, the expected rent from the worker in period 2 is increasing in b.
In the next proposition, I argue that and hold in the l ≤ p l p 1 1 2 equilibrium. In order to do so, I need to introduce an additional restriction on the market's belief to rule our unreasonable equilibria. When the market expects the employer to promote all workers in period 1 and it unexpectedly keeps someone in job 1, however, what would be a reasonable ? Any could be sustained in a sequential equilibrium because it does l l 1 1 not restrict beliefs in the off-the-equilibrium path at all in our model. To rule out unreasonable beliefs on the off-the-equilibrium paths, we seek sequential equilibria that pass the test of equilibrium domination, which is often called "intuitive criterion." 6 An equilibrium fails the test when a system of beliefs that supports the equilibrium responses puts positive probability in an off-the-equilibrium path to the player type who gets worse off by the deviation from his equilibrium response.
In our context, for example, players are firms but their types are determined by the characteristics of their workers. Suppose all workers are promoted in period 1. This equilibrium strategy can be supported by the market belief that all or most of the workers assigned job 1 in period 1 are high-ability ones. However, it is unreasonable to believe that a worker who is unexpectedly kept in job 1 has , because retaining a high-ability a H worker in job 1 is less profitable than promoting him for the employer given the equilibrium belief that all workers should be promoted in period 1, regardless of how the market reacts to the deviation. Then, an equilibrium with such a belief should fail the test.
The next proposition provides the necessary and sufficient condition for early promotion assuming that firms do not promote workers if they are indifferent between the two choices.
Proposition 1. In the sequential equilibrium that passes the test of equilibrium domination, low-ability workers are never promoted in period 1. High-ability workers are promoted if and only if s Ϫ s 1
Proof. See appendix C. Let us present the sketch of the proof here. Among the four possible outcomes discussed earlier, only cases (1) and (2) can arise in the equilibrium and and . Case (4) can be a sequential equilibrium l ≤ p l p 1 1 2 but does not pass the test of equilibrium domination. Therefore, we only need to check the incentive of the employer to promote a high-ability worker.
A worker with will be promoted if and only if
Note that in assumption 1 implies that . There-
fore, high-ability workers will be promoted in period 1 if and only if
The intuition is given as follows. Firm-specific human capital is one source of economic rent that firms can exploit from employment and the firm's profits from employment in job 1 and job 2 are increasing in the average values of firm-specific human capital and , respectively. s s
The firm, discovering a capable worker, could extract additional rent by delaying promotion of the worker because the market might not be able to tell which workers have high ability if late promotion is a noisy signal of the worker's ability. When such a signal jamming effect is significant, the market wage does not vary with the second-period job assignment as much as it does with the first-period job assignment in general. The extreme case is our model, in which the second-period wage does not vary at all with the job assignment in the period. The information rent in our model is increasing in a but can
be either increasing or decreasing in b.
We present one numerical example to illustrate how optimal promotion policy shifts as a parameter changes. Let , , , Let us call the promotion policy the "late promotion policy" when the firm assigns no worker to job 2 in period 1. Let us call the policy the "early promotion policy" when it promotes the worker as soon as his ability is revealed to be high. This dichotomy is not the by-product of binary assumption of workers' ability but rather that of binary job structure. We can find such two distinct equilibria even in models in which a is distributed uniformly. Since the market knows that the worker who is promoted in period 1 has high ability, such a worker should have a high outside option value and will switch firms whenever he finds that his match quality with the employer is low.
IV. Turnover, Income Dispersion, and Firm-Sponsored Training
The immediate implication of the equilibrium analysis is that labor mobility is high in the early promotion policy equilibrium while there is no labor mobility in the late promotion policy equilibrium. Under the early promotion policy, an able worker whose match quality turns out to be low (i.e., ) for the first employer can always find a better b ! 0 opportunity outside. The turnover rate in the early promotion policy is .
Second, compare the lifetime income distribution in the two equilibria. The two promotion policies create different degrees of asymmetric information between the employer and the market, leading to substantially different outside option values for capable workers. Under the late promotion policy in our model, there is no income dispersion because very little information about worker ability is revealed to the market. Under the early promotion policy, there is a substantial lifetime income gap between those who are promoted in w (2) ϩ w (2, 2) Ϫ w (1) Ϫ w (1, 1) 1 2 1 2 period 1 and those who are not because "stars" in the fast track can always find a better outside option than others and thus gain a large share of surplus. Although job assignment is inefficient under the late promotion policy, it does not necessarily mean that the whole system of resource allocation is inefficient. For instance, a firm that adopts the late promotion policy could be more efficient than that with the early promotion policy if: (1) a production technology that induces late promotion is far more efficient than one that leads to early promotion or (2) the late promotion policy encourages more investment in human capital. To illustrate the latter point, let us consider the incentive for firm-sponsored training.
Suppose that in our model the employer can improve a by providing general training during the training period. The cost of providing training is fully incurred by the employer either because workers are liquidityconstrained or because provision of training is not contractible. We can confirm the result by Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) that firms have an incentive to provide general training when wages are compressed, and this incentive should be stronger as the wages are more compressed. Let and be the employer's expected profit in period 1 and 2 from e l P P the employment of a worker when the firm adopts the early promotion policy and the late promotion policy, respectively. Then,
We consider three cases of how training affects a: (5) and (6), we can conclude immediately that firms with the early promotion policy have no incentive to provide general training (because does not depend on e P or a) while those with the late promotion policy do for cases (1) E(a) and (2). For case (3), the comparison between two different technologies is not straightforward because when the early (late) promotion is optimal (i.e., ), . If
the actual impact of general training is the combination of cases (1)- (3), however, we at least can make an intuitive argument that firms with the late promotion policy are more likely than those with the early promotion policy to provide general training. When we consider this incentive effect, it is quite possible that the late promotion policy which leads to ex post inefficient job assignment could be ex ante efficient by encouraging firmsponsored training. This should not be a surprising conclusion because Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) already have demonstrated that distortion of the wage structure may actually improve welfare.
In the next few sections, I attempt to explain the differences in human resource management practices and turnover between the United States and Japan using this framework.
V. Japanese and U.S. Employment Systems
There are notable differences in human resource management practices and wage policies between the United States and Japan. In a Japanese firm, (1) long-term employment relationships are more prevalent and the turnover rate is much lower (see, e.g., Hashimoto and Raisian 1985) ; (2) white-collar workers who join large firms are typically promoted to managerial jobs later than their counterparts in the United States and are not differentiated from their cohort until 10-15 years after entry; 7 (3) the income dispersion among employees is typically smaller; 8 and (4) more firm-sponsored training programs are offered.
9 (See Aoki [1988] , Koike [1991] , and Itoh [1994] for general discussions.)
There have been a number of works that explain subsets of the labor market differences between Japan and the United States. The low labor mobility in Japan often has been explained by the argument that investment in firm-specific human capital is higher in Japanese firms than in American firms. According to this theory, since the cost of switching firms is high when firm-specific human capital is valuable, mid-career separation is rare, and thus an active labor market for mid-career job changers has not developed in Japan. Low labor mobility also is consistent with the agency-theoretical hypothesis presented by Lazear (1979) , who argues that upward-sloping wage-tenure profiles raise the cost of shirking and thus provide incentives to workers. Some researchers, including Mincer and Higuchi (1988) and Hashimoto (1979) , have attributed Japan's high investment in firm-specific human capital to rapid technological changes, high growth in the Japanese industries, and/or Japanese firms' special emphasis on training for job flexibility and rotation in the postwar era. However, if investment in firm-specific human capital is so profitable in economies with rapid technological change and growth, why have other countries such as Korea and Taiwan not shared a similar pattern in turnover rates? One approach to the above question is to show multiple equilibria (see, e.g., Prendergast 1989; Abe 1994; Morita 2001) . In Morita (2001) , for example, firms' choice of continuous process improvement make the skills of their employees more firm-specific and their trained employees more valuable. Since workers' outside option values and, therefore, the labor turnover are decreasing in the number of firms that adopt continuous process improvement, firms' choices of technology display strategic complementarity. The result is the rise of multiple equilibria: one equilibrium exhibits lower turnover and more accumulation of human capital and the other exhibits high turnover and less accumulation of human capital. This approach, though, has not fully answered the ques-8 I do not know any comparative studies of intrafirm income dispersion between the United States and Japan. However, several data are consistent with this conventional wisdom. Koike (1988) compared wage differentials between managers and average white-collar workers within the same age groups in Japan with those in EC countries and showed that Japan is one of those with the smallest differentials. One indicator of intrafirm income dispersion is the ratio of CEO pay/ average worker earnings. A most recent comparison can be found in a New York Times article, "Executive Pay: A Special Report," dated April 7, 2002, which reported that Japanese top executives earn about 12 times more than the average worker while American counterparts earn 180 times more than their employees.
9 For U.S.-Japan comparison of firm-sponsored training program, see Lynch (1994) , Hashimoto (1994) , and MacDuffie and Kochan (1995) . tion: why and how does one economy end up in one equilibrium while another economy may realize the other one?
There has not been much research on why the late promotion pattern is prominent in Japan, whereas in the United States, there is a tendency to select and promote "high-potential people" at an earlier stage. Prendergast (1992) assumes that the employer has better information about the worker's promotion prospects than the worker himself and argues that the firm can give incentives to stars by revealing this private information, offering a discretionary wage raise to them at an early stage. When the returns to training workers of low ability are high, however, says Prendergast, the firm should not signal its private information-to retain incentives for its low ability workers. He refers to this pooling strategy as the Japanese model of career development. The problem with this model is that it is hard to assume that such asymmetric information can persist for a decade or more. Umezaki's (2001) recent empirical study of Japanese career development shows a strong correlation between a worker's promotion and what tasks he has been assigned until the promotion. If this is true, even if the firm promotes workers very late, each worker should be able to infer his promotion prospect based on his task history.
The model presented in this article offers consistent explanations for major differences in patterns of mobility, promotion, intrafirm earning distributions, and the provision of firm-sponsored general training between the two countries. Simply take the early promotion policy as the U.S. model and the late promotion policy as the Japanese model, and all empirical observations discussed so far follow as the characteristics of the corresponding equilibria. The remaining critical question, then, is how did Japan end up with one equilibrium and the United States end up with the other. This section presents a number of possible factors that could have caused the two countries to select different equilibria.
Differences in Organizational Structures
The distinctive promotion policies adopted in Japan and the United States are consistent with the organizational structures each country selected.
First, job classification tends to be standardized and specialized in the United States, while in Japanese firms, job demarcation is ambiguous, and workers are assigned multiple tasks and periodically rotate among tasks or among related divisions. This implies that the variance in ability a in a job tends to be small for U.S. firms because jobs are narrowly defined and standardized while it tends to be large for Japanese firms because of a smaller number of job categories and the ambiguity of job classification. Recall that in (8) is increasing in a and thus
a greater a is more likely to generate the late promotion equilibrium. Furthermore, the difference in job design also implies that should s Ϫ s 2 1 be higher for U.S. firms than for Japanese firms: if the workers' tasks are standardized and require less coordination, they will need less experience (lower ), whereas the managers in such firms will need more on-the-job s 1 experience to design task allocation and write manuals (higher ). On the s 2 other hand, ambiguous job classification, subjective evaluation, and the implicit reward system in Japanese firms have enabled more flexible task assignments and thus more coordination among work groups leading to high value from firm-specific human capital at lower-level jobs.
Second, in the typical Japanese firm, the process of decision making has been more decentralized than in the typical American firm and more de facto decision rights have been delegated to the lower-level workers (see Kagono et al. 1985; Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990) . This makes sense, for Owan (2003) has shown that more decision rights should be delegated to the workers in a firm with multiskilling practices than in a firm with a specialized job structure. Delegation also can be interpreted as the Japanese firm's response to having adopted the late promotion strategy, a response that helps minimize the cost of delaying promotion. Whatever the reason, the decentralization is consistent with a lower parameter value for -the worker's experience will have a higher value when he has s Ϫ s 2 1 more decisions to make. On the other hand, the manager may not need much experience on the job if he can delegate many operational decisions to lower-level workers and focus on more strategic decisions. Hence, the need to delay promotion induced the organizational structure that made the late promotion strategy optimal in Japan. In contrast, in the United States, distrust between management and workers prevented management from effectively delegating authority to the lower-level workers, leading to higher , which in turn supported the early promotion strategy.
Note that the above explanation that attributes the difference in promotion pattern to the difference in organizational structure allows a multiple equilibrium argument. Although there is a unique equilibrium for any choice of organizational structure, there exist two equilibria when organizational choice is endogenous. This raises the question I asked earlier for the other multiple equilibrium arguments: why and how did one economy select one equilibrium? In order to explore this question, let me make a couple of hypotheses based on historical facts.
10
Limited Knowledge and Capital Accumulation in Modern-Era Japan
The rapid expansion of heavy industry after the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) created a severe shortage of skilled labor in Japan. Big enterprises replaced the conventional apprenticeship under independent master crafts-men with systematic corporate training programs, to effectively obtain and retain trained workers. The importance of corporate training also was intensified by the technology used during the decades after the First World War. In the United States, large batch and mass production technology was developed in the automobile industry in the 1910s, and in the following decades, it diffused to other major industries, leading to division and downgraded skill of labor. In contrast, Japanese factories during this time relied more on workers with broad skills and general-purpose machinery due to its low scale production and a low capital stock. This trend continued even after the Second World War. The war-ravaged Japanese economy was starved for capital and for foreign exchange until the early 1950s.
Limited knowledge and capital stocks as well as limited vocational training opportunities outside enterprises in modern Japan presumably made the return on firm-sponsored training significantly higher than in the United States and other leading countries. One possible hypothesis is that, in an attempt to recoup the cost of training, firms delayed promotion to create asymmetric information and compress wages.
Wartime Policies
In 1938-42 during the Second World War, several policy measures were enacted to control labor mobility and wages. They separated the link between a worker's productivity and his wage and foreshadowed the rise of corporate egalitarianism in Japan.
11 The coercive wage convergence during the war enabled the unions to establish an egalitarian wage structure and achieve exceptional solidarity of employees, which helped them to survive the difficult years following the war. It is plausible, however, that the management, facing the union resistance to changes in wage structure, was forced to adopt the late promotion strategy to retain the most able workers in the increasingly tightening labor market in the decades after the war. 11 The following elements of the measures have created a prototype for the postwar wage policy: (1) the wage control policy required management to give pay raises to virtually all employees according to their seniority, while allowing such components as skill, attitude, and diligence to be considered in determining the amount of the raise but only to a limited extent; (2) the sharp status differences between the white-collar and the blue-collar worker during the prewar period were substantially reduced, and they were treated almost equally in determining wages and benefits; (3) the government forcefully promoted "livelihood wages" claiming that wages ought to guarantee the worker's livelihood according to his needs, and generous family allowances were permitted; and (4) as a mean to improve workers' incentives, various allowances and benefits such as attendance bonuses, overtime pay, and retirement allowances prevailed from large to mediumand small-size firms.
Recent Changes in the U.S. Work Practices and Implications
The discussion in this section also has some implications for the future U.S. labor market. The recent studies of work organization and human resource practices in the United States have revealed that organizational structures in the country are moving toward what is standard in Japan. For example, Osterman (1994 Osterman ( , 2000 reports that, in 1997, 71% of U.S. private establishments surveyed had two or more innovative human resource management practices such as quality circles, job rotation, selfmanaged teams, and total quality management, up from 38% in 1992. A similar trend is also documented in Appelbaum and Batt (1994) , Black and Lynch (2001) , and Cappelli and Neumark (2001) . If those practices are not mainly confined to blue-collar workers but spreading across different occupations and industries, my article suggests that this change, if sustained, will have some important effects on other labor market variables such as turnover and income distribution in the long run. We might observe lower turnover and smaller income dispersion along with delayed promotion decisions in the next decades. The empirical analysis of such impact has to be left for future research.
VI. Conclusion
The literature of job assignment has found that, in the presence of asymmetric information about workers' characteristics between their employers and the other potential employers, jobs might be assigned inefficiently because of the signaling effect of job assignment. This work has demonstrated that firms' strategic reaction to this asymmetric information problem might partly explain cross-country differences in promotion pattern, turnover, earnings distribution, and firm-sponsored training.
There have been several explanations as to why turnover has been lower in Japan than in the United States. The human capital hypothesis attributes it to higher and more continuous investment in firm-specific human capital in Japan, while the agency hypothesis argues that upward-sloping wage-tenure profiles created a high cost of switching firms. The former hypothesis has been supported by a number of theories that exhibit multiple equilibria. There also is an argument that Japanese firms are reluctant to hire workers away from other firms because of a history of social sanctions imposed on poaching firms. Such cooperation in the business community might enhance efficiency by protecting firms' investment in human capital when the capital market is incomplete and workers are liquidity constrained. This work offers another hypothesis, which posits that the difference may have been created partly by the different degrees of asymmetric information between the employer and the market under the different promotion policies. The theory, simply stated, is that a policy of promoting workers at a late stage of their careers enlarges asymmetric information about the worker's ability, thereby reducing the chance that a worker will find a better outside opportunity and giving the employer a higher incentive to provide training.
We also have demonstrated that the choice of late promotion policies by large Japanese firms is consistent with their choice of organizational structure and presumably was encouraged by their institutional environment during the first half of the last century, which is characterized by limited knowledge and capital stocks and the wartime control of labor mobility and wage.
The systematic connection among turnover, promotion, earnings pattern, and firm-sponsored training also might help to clarify some crossindustry differences as well as cross-country ones but will be left for future research.
Appendix A Proof of Lemma 1
The worker who is assigned job 1 in period 1 should stay and be promoted in period 2 if and only if
and defineb
The inequality contradicts the condition , since
by assumption 1. Since the firm earns profit from a worker who is proa ϩ b Ϫ w (1, 2) 2 moted in period 2 and from one who stays in job 1,
Similarly, the worker who is assigned job 2 in period 1 should stay in the same job with the same firm if and only if a ϩ b Ϫ w (2, 2) 1
[a ϩ b Ϫ w (2, 2) Ϫ max {x ϩ s Ϫ w (2, 1), 0}]
where the first inequality is derived from a ϩ b Ϫ w (2, 2) 1 max {x ϩ profit in the same periods when the worker type is a. Then say that t 1 is equilibrium dominated at a if P*(a) 1 max P(a, t , w ) p . Sequential equilibrium strategies fail the test of equilibrium P(a, t , w*) 1 L selection if for some a and that is equilibrium dominated at a, it is t 1 impossible to sustain the equilibrium wages with beliefs that put zero conditional probability on a given . t 1 From lemma 3, there are four possible outcomes: (1) all workers are assigned job 1 in period 1, (2) only part or all of high-ability workers are promoted in period 1, (3) all high-ability workers and part of low-ability workers are promoted in period 1, and (4) all workers are promoted. We evaluate each of those four possible equilibrium outcomes and prove that 1 and 2 are the only possible cases and and always hold. l ≤ p l p 1 1 2
1. All workers are assigned job 1 in period 1. From the presumption, . It is easily seen that assigning job 2 is l p p 1 equilibrium dominated at because
, where the first equality is derived from lemma 3 and the first P(a , 2, w*) L L inequality is from assumption 1. Therefore, an equilibrium does not pass the test of equilibrium domination if it is impossible to sustain the equilibrium wages with beliefs that put zero conditional probability on a L given . Note that any less than cannot be leads to and . Then, by sub-
Hence, low-ability workers are never promoted in the equilibrium, leading to contradiction.
4. All workers are promoted. , where the first equality is derived from the fact that the P(a , 1, w*) H L equilibrium wage in period 1 is the value of a low-ability worker for the market in the period. Therefore, an equilibrium does not pass the test of equilibrium domination if it is impossible to sustain the equilibrium wages with beliefs that put zero conditional probability on given , a t p 1 . Then, all the job assignments should be efficient and a w (2, 2) p x 2 worker should be promoted in period 1 if and only if . This a p a H contradicts the assumption that all workers are promoted.
Therefore, only the first two cases are feasible as equilibria, and l ≤ 1 and .
The rest of the proof is sketched in the text and sequential rationality and consistency can be easily checked.
